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KEY ISSUES IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE SINCE THE
TIANANMEN INCIDENT
Nakai Yoshifumi
This paper focuses on two aspects of Sino- Japanese relations: the struc-
ture in which these relations have evolved in the past fee\v decades; and the
dynamics of the relations after recent historic events. This paper concludes with
an assessment of present Sino-Japanese relations in an age of uncertainty.
Despite tremendous changes in the international environment, Sino - Japa-
nese relations in the first few years of the 1990s seem to be showing remarkable
strength and cordiality compared to previous decades. The future of these rela-
tions is, however, full of uncertainties. Sino-Japanese relations have succeeded
in shaking off some of the historical burdens but, at the same time, we are
entering into uncharted territory where the old framework is less relevant.
The Tiananmen Square Incident dramatically changed Western percep-
tions of the PRC government. According to US public opinion surveys of China,
the percentage of those who answered favorable to China dropped sharply after
the Incident1. The same was true in Japan, although the direct impact of the
Incident might have been stronger in the United States, where more than one
hundred thousand Chinese students and scholars, some of them politically
active, had been staying. The Bush administration imposed its first series of
sanctions against China immediately after the crackdown in Beijing and took the
initiative in formulating a broad coalition of Western nations. The European
Community decided to postpone economic aid to China in June. In the subse-
quent meeting of the Group of Seven in Paris in July, Japan joined the list of
nations suspending economic assistance programs to Beijing2.
The Bush administration’s policy was not so different from Japan’s basic
attitude, imposing limited sanctions and, at the same time, preserving a viable
working relationship with Beijing by maintaining channels of communication
with the Cheese government. Perhaps the Japanese government was more ear-
nest in emphasizing continuing communication with the Chinese government.
In the July Summit, Japan insisted that a clause, which specifically mentioned
the need to avoid isolating China, should be included in the Summit Declara-
tion3.
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In 1989 Japan was not in a position to initiate its own policies toward
China, which might discourage joint efforts by the United States and other
Western countries. Economic friction between Japan and the United States had
reached a crisis point in May 1989, when the US government accused Japan of
unfair trade conduct and threatened to impose sanctions based on the Super
301 legislation. The Japanese government, therefore, had to synchronize its
policies toward China with those of the United States carefully.  In July 1989
President Bush secretly sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing to meet with senior
Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping4. They visited Beijing again in De-
cember. At the same time, Japan and China started exchanging several semi-
official visits.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has walked a fine line in continu-
ing communication with the Chinese government and not eliciting antagonistic
reactions from the United States. There has been an organizational memory or
know-how within the Ministry dealing with this delicate matter. Quite a few top
level officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry had already engaged in negotia-
tions with the PRC on various issues since the normalization of diplomatic rela-
tions. These officials have contributed to maintaining the continuity of Japan’s
basic standpoint toward China throughout the crisis.
China refrained from criticizing Japan. In July 1989, Prime Minister Li Peng
expressed his appreciation of Japan’s fair attitude toward the recent suppres-
sion of the riot in Beijing. In September Li Peng told an LDP delegation that he
expected Japan to play a role in breaking strained relations with the Western
countries. Li also allowed the forced repatriation of illegal Chinese immigrants in
Japan. This decision greatly alleviated Japanese concerns about the increasing
wave of illegal Chinese immigrants. On the same occasion, Deng Xiaoping said
that he understood Japan’s special circumstances and commented favorably
about Japan’s attitude toward China4.
Despite these signals from China, Japan proceeded carefully by synchro-
nizing its actions with those of the United States. A breakthrough in Chinese-US
relations came in June 1990 when the Chinese government allowed the depar-
ture of Fang Lizhi, a renowned dissident, to the United States and President
Bush renewed China’s most favored nation trade status for a year. Right after
this, in July, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki announced to President Bush that
Japan would resume the third yen loan to China, which had been frozen since
the Tiananmen Incident. By this time, the Japanese side had done enough ground-
work to proceed with the resumption. China had already sent a minister-level
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delegation under the Director of the State Planning Commission Zou Jiahua to
Japan in January 1990. In early 1991, several incumbent ministers of the Kaifu
administration visited China and the Chinese side responded with visits by
Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Li Lanqing and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen.
The Chinese government arranged a “special welcome” for Prime Minister
Kaifu Toshiki in August 1991, which indicated the full recovery of Sino-Japa-
nese relations. For the PRC government, this visit was an opportunity to show
the world that China had become stable again after the Incident in Beijing. The
Japanese side, on the other hand, wanted to show its initiative in nuking eco-
nomic aid to political improvement. Kaifu promised a yen loan for the year of
1991 amounting to 130 billion yen, a clear signal of Japan’s continuous support
of China’s reform and liberalization policy. At the same time, Kaifu told Prime
Minister Li Peng that Japan would take into account several conditions for
economic assistance. Japan would link, Kaifu announced, its economic assis-
tance to military expenditures and to the degree of democracy in recipient na-
tions. Kaifu also mentioned that Japan would appreciate China’s participation in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its positive commitment to the interna-
tional restriction of arms sales. Finally, Kaifu even touched on a sensitive ques-
tion of democracy and human rights, expressing the concerns of the interna-
tional community about democratization and human rights in China5.
Kaifu’s visit indicated an emerging new trend in Sino-Japanese relations
after the 1989 crisis. Japan continued its economic commitment to China and, at
the same time, became more outspoken politically, expressing its opinions which
were not exclusively Japan’s own but were common among the Western na-
tions, to China. China basically accepted this change, differentiating Japan’s
stance from the United States and emphasizing the common interests of Japan
and China in maintaining stability and prosperity in Asia.
This emphasis on Asia and the special relations between Japan and China
originated from strategic and economic considerations. Strategically, China felt
the need to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors, Vietnam and South
Korea in particular. The Gulf War in early 1990 clearly showed the supremacy of
the fighting power of the United States and the strength of the joint intervention
organized by the United Nations. Economically, China and Japan shared recog-
nition that Asia, as a region, had accumulated formidable economic strength and
had tremendous potential to become the driving force of the world economy.
This recognition led to a confidence in the economic relations between China
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and Japan. Sino-Japanese trade, which showed downward trends in 1989 and
1990, rose again in 1991.
Right after Kaifu’s visit in August 1991, conservative Russian leaders
planned a coup, which soon failed and eventually led to the resignation of
Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the
Soviet Bloc offered proof to liberal thinkers and Tiananmen dissidents who
think that the life of the Chinese Communist Party is limited. On the other hand,
instability and economic disorder in Eastern Europe make the relative stability
and economic prosperity of China stand out. Hi regard to Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, this period was marked by progression, not regression, in mutual rela-
tions.
Seeing the coup in Moscow unfolding and collapsing, China displayed
some nervousness. By the end of 1991, however, the Chinese leaders seemed to
have recovered their confidence in their rule7. They started expressing the opin-
ion that China’s situation was different from that of the former Soviet Union. In
the new year of 1992, China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, took a trip to
the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong province. His speeches during the
trip became Party Central Directive Number Three, which was endorsed by the
Party Central Committee and distributed widely in March. Deng ordered the
Chinese leaders to take bolder measures in the pursuit of economic reform and
liberalization.   Economic development was. According to Deng, the ‘life or
death’ questions for the Chinese Communist Party.
The Soviet Union collapsed, Deng continued, because it failed to reform
its economy and lost the support of the general populace. This endorsement of
the economic reform policy by Deng during his “southern trip” triggered the
massive flow of foreign capital into China.
In diplomacy, the collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged the tendency
within the Chinese leadership to direct most of China’s diplomatic effort and
energy towards the only remaining superpower, the United States. The United
States not only displayed its superior military force in the Gulf War but also
continued pressing China on the issues of trade imbalance and human rights.
The PRC government strongly opposed moves within the United States to link
most favored nation status to improvement in human rights conditions. On
several occasions nice 1991, however, China has engaged in intensive negotia-
tions with US government officials over economic issues, such as intellectual
property rights and market access, and conceded to US demands8. On the ques-
tion of most favored nation status,  China and the United States have estab-
lished a scheme to avoid outright confrontation. :
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In sum, the general policy directions of the Chinese government since the
summer of 1991-the promotion of further economic reform and the avoidance of
confrontation with the United States-matched Japan’s policy orientation and
benefited Sino-Japanese relations. Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s visit
to Tokyo in April 1992 and Emperor Akihito’s visit to China in October symbol-
ized the good relationship between Japan and China. Jiang’s visit displayed not
only Japan’s goodwill toward the present Chinese leadership but also Japan’s
appreciation of the stability   in Asia. Japan supported not only China’s push
toward further economic reform but also China’s commitment to a good neigh-
bor policy in Asia9. China established diplomatic relations with Israel in January
and with South Korea in August, and it was reported that fifteen heads of state
visited China in 1992, including Boris Yeltsin of Russia in December.
Despite historical burdens recent changes in the international context, or
perhaps because of them, China and Japan have succeeded in establishing a
cordial working relationship .The economic relationship which had been the
constant theme of Sino- Japanese relations since the early days has proven to
be sturdy despite time and political changes .The political relationship seems to
be taking a more independent course than before. It had been dependent on
China’s relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union in the past.
Since the end of the US-Soviet Cold War, both China and Japan seem to be
searching for a new international framework. During these transitions, China
and Japan seem to be relying on the old principle of the “separation of econom-
ics from politics.”
After Emperor Akihito’s visit, no serious issue has appeared in Sino -
Japanese relations until last June when Taiwan’s Lee Denghui visited the United
States. This does not necessarily prove the stability of the relationship, how-
ever. With their economic accomplishments in mind, both Japan and China seem
to have become more assertive in their foreign policies. Japan’s initiative in
linking economic assistance to democratization coincided with its move toward
accepting an increasing role in international peace keeping operations, exempli-
fied by its decision to send Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in 1992. China
must have become uneasy about Japan’s growing political influence as China
has also showed its political assertiveness on several occasions. China’s de-
fense budget has been growing more than ten percent each year since 1989, and
recorded twenty percent increase in 1994. China has passed its own Maritime
Law which claims China’s sovereignty over disputed territories in the East and
South China Sea. It has also repeatedly conducted nuclear tests, ignoring inter-
national concerns about nuclear proliferation and Japan’s requests for restraints.
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Besides political assertiveness, we are facing growing economic competi-
tion and inevitable political uncertainty. China, which had turned into the im-
porter of two basic commodities, crude oil and grain, must seek, together with
Japan, stable sources for those resources. China and Japan are already the two
largest exporters to the United States. As its industrialization goes on, China
would concentrate on producing more value-added goods, and that course may
lead to a collision with Japan. On the political front, the issue of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program proved that when the political grip of the Cold War
structure loosened, a new set of problems may arise suddenly”. Old problems
are not completely dead, either12. Moreover, China and Japan are facing uncer-
tainty in their domestic politics. Japan has lost one of its most stable political
frameworks of the past recently, i.e., the rule of the LDP. China is also facing an
inevitable transition in political leadership, i.e., and the death of the paramount
leader. We hope the leadership transitions in both Japan and China go on peace-
fully and smoothly, but as old Japanese saying states, in politics “it is dark one
step ahead.”
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